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Global Professional Service Firms and the Challenge
of Institutional Complexity: ‘Field Relocation’
as a Response Strategy
James Faulconbridge and Daniel Muzio
Lancaster University; Newcastle University
ABSTRACT In this paper we use the case of the internationalization of English law ﬁrms into
Italy, and the refocusing of their operations on the city of Milan, to make a number of
contributions to existing literatures on responses to institutional complexity. First, we
contribute to the literature on how organizations address complexity at the ﬁeld level, by
revealing the role of ‘ﬁeld relocation’ as a particular response strategy. We also identify a
number of organizational tactics – re-scoping, re-scaling, and re-stafﬁng – through which ‘ﬁeld
relocation’ is accomplished. Second, we also show the importance of further developing our
understanding of the geography of institutional ﬁelds by highlighting how the ‘receptivity’ of
different ﬁeld locations may affect responses to complexity. This identiﬁes the importance of
geographically locating ﬁelds and sub-ﬁelds in studies of organizational responses to
institutional complexity.
Keywords: ﬁeld location, institutional complexity, institutional receptivity, multinationals,
professional services ﬁrms, strategic responses
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of work calls for more attention to how multinational enterprises
(MNEs) can reveal distinctive theoretical and empirical insights into the challenges of
and responses to institutional complexity (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2010, 2011; Smets
and Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2012). As they operate across multiple and
diverse international contexts, MNEs are inevitably exposed to competing and poten-
tially incompatible institutional pressures, and therefore to experiences of complexity. In
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particular, as exempliﬁed by the literature on institutional duality (Kostova and Roth,
2002), MNEs are exposed to a particular form of complexity which arises from the
need to reconcile the different logics of home and host country jurisdictions. However,
despite this theoretical promise and the growing importance of MNEs in the contempo-
rary economy, our knowledge of their responses to complexity remains limited.
This paper is based on an exploratory case study of a group of English law ﬁrms,
their internationalization into the Italian market, and their responses to the institu-
tional complexity they encountered. As a particular type of MNE, law ﬁrms poten-
tially experience and respond to complexity in unique ways. As Muzio and
Faulconbridge (2013) highlight, the partnership form of ownership and governance
which characterizes these organizations distinguishes them from public owned corpo-
rations insofar that partners are the co-owners of the ﬁrm. This means that these
ﬁrms lack the hierarchical headquarters–subsidiary relationships which characterize
most corporate MNEs. Thus, partners in host country ofﬁces are, at least in theory,
equal to their peers at head-ofﬁce and, therefore, enjoy a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂu-
ence and autonomy. Hence, the partnership model demands a degree of consultation
and consensus building between subsidiaries which is unparalleled in other types of
MNEs. In addition, legal services are characterized by high levels of national embedd-
edness due to the role of lawyers in the administration of justice (e.g., Krause, 1996).
This provides partners in each ofﬁce of the ﬁrm with further resources to resist the
imposition of strategies by headquarters. These distinctive features all potentially
affect how law ﬁrms in particular and professional services ﬁrms in general might
experience and respond to complexity.
We, therefore, use our exploratory case to address a number of empirical questions:
How do law ﬁrms, as a distinctive type of MNE, experience institutional complexity
when they internationalize? How do these ﬁrms respond to such complexity?
Addressing these questions emphasizes the distinctively spatial forms of complexity expe-
rienced by global law ﬁrms, and how these organizations may respond to such com-
plexity by exploiting the uneven and dynamic nature of ﬁelds. These insights allow the
paper to make two related contributions to recent calls to give greater consideration to
ﬁeld level characteristics when analysing the causes of (Davis and Marquis, 2005;
Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Wooten and Hoffman, 2008), and, in particular,
responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Quirke, 2013).
First, the paper reveals how MNEs can respond to complexity through a ‘ﬁeld relo-
cation’ strategy. For our case study ﬁrms this involved relocating to a speciﬁc sub-ﬁeld
where complexity was reduced. We also identify three key organizational tactics – re-
scoping, re-scaling, and re-stafﬁng – through which ‘ﬁeld relocation’ was accom-
plished. This extends recent studies (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets and
Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2012) which show how organizations can handle
complexity internally within their own structures and practices by highlighting the
role of a ﬁeld level strategy. Second, in line with growing recognition of the need for
institutional theory to take the geography of ﬁelds more seriously (e.g., Greenwood
et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis et al., 2007), our paper highlights the rela-
tionship between geographical location and ‘receptivity’, whereby this concept refers
to the potential of a particular ﬁeld location to be more open to alternative
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institutional logics. Speciﬁcally, we show how English law ﬁrms relocated within the
ﬁeld by refocusing their operations on the city of Milan. This location was more
‘receptive’ to their home country logics, thus reducing the degree of complexity they
experienced. Together, the insights we provide into ‘ﬁeld relocation’ and ‘receptivity’
highlight the importance of locating the ﬁeld in studies of responses to complexity,
given that in uneven and dynamic ﬁelds different locations are associated with varying
degrees of complexity.
The rest of the paper proceeds over eight further sections. We begin by reviewing
the literatures on institutional complexity. We then explain our methodology and
introduce our case study. This is followed by three empirical sections, focusing respec-
tively on: causes, experiences, and responses to complexity. We then describe the
Milan sub-ﬁeld to which our case study ﬁrms were able to relocate. We conclude by
developing the theoretical implications of our case study.
Organizational Responses to Institutional Complexity
Institutional complexity arises when organizations ‘confront incompatible prescriptions
from multiple institutional logics’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 317). MNEs are a par-
ticularly interesting context for the study of institutional complexity. As MNEs strad-
dle different national jurisdictions, they experience a particular form of complexity
arising from different national logics. This has been long understood in the literature
as ‘institutional duality’ (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Muzio and
Faulconbridge, 2013); this concept refers to headquarter subsidiary relationships
where ‘each foreign subsidiary is confronted with two distinct sets of isomorphic pres-
sures’ (Kostova and Roth, 2002, p. 216), emanating respectively from home and host
country contexts. As a result, ‘achieving and maintaining legitimacy are very difﬁcult
for MNEs because of the multiplicity and complexity of legitimating environments’
(Kostova et al., 2008, p. 1000). Such difﬁculties increase with the ‘institutional dis-
tance’ between home and host country; this consisting of ‘the difference between the
institutional proﬁles of the two countries’ in question (Kostova, 1999, p. 316). In this
context, we contend that institutional duality is a particular form of institutional com-
plexity concerned with how MNEs experience the potentially incompatible prescrip-
tions of home and host country logics. Duality is, thus, a form of complexity which
has distinctive spatial dimensions as tensions emerge as much from national variants
of a particular logic, such as professionalism, as from the collision of altogether differ-
ent logics such as professionalism and managerialism. For the purposes of this paper,
we use the term complexity when discussing our case study, as this is the broader
term used in the literature we draw on and contribute to, but it is the speciﬁcities of
duality as a spatial form of complexity that are our primary concern.
There is now an extensive literature that examines how organizations respond to
institutional complexity (e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011;
Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013;
Smets et al., 2012). Most recently studies have focused on responses which seek to man-
age the effects of complexity through various intra-organizational tactics. For instance
the notion of compartmentalization (Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Hamilton
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and Gioia, 2009) has been invoked to describe how complexity can be avoided by par-
titioning and containing different logics within distinct and separate organizational
structures. This tactic is typical of structurally differentiated hybrids (Greenwood et al.,
2011). Conversely, other organizations allow ‘different logics to pervade the organiza-
tion and rely on individuals to strike an appropriate balance’ (Jarzabkowski et al.,
2013, p. 42). Such organizations are referred to as blended hybrids insofar as they
attempt ‘to combine and layer “practices” taken from different logics into a single orga-
nization’ (see also Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smets et al., 2012).
A growing stream of work considers how in the context of such responses, organi-
zations seek to balance the demands of competing logics by managing individuals,
their practices, and identities. Battilana and Dorado (2010), for instance, show how a
Bolivian micro-ﬁnance provider succeeded in blending commercial and community
logics by purposely recruiting people with no previous exposure and therefore attach-
ment to either logic. A more recent ‘practice turn’ (e.g., Jarzabkowski et al. 2013;
Smets et al., 2012, 2014) stresses the need to focus on the interaction patterns
through which individuals balance, reconcile, and switch between different logics.
Thus, Smets et al. (2012), in their analysis of English law ﬁrms in Germany, highlight
how organizations can address complexity through processes of ‘situated improvising’
as workers devise practical solutions to the challenges of complexity as part of their
everyday activities.
The literature described above focuses on how organizations can deal with com-
plexity internally, through their own structural conﬁgurations, recruitment strat-
egies, collaborative dynamics, and work practices. Less attention has been paid to
how organizations also seek to address complexity externally, through ﬁeld level
responses. This is particularly important because of the uneven and heterogeneous
distribution of institutional pressures within ﬁelds (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012),
which may present organizations with particular responses to complexity.
Contributing to this agenda, Smets et al. (2012) link practice and ﬁeld level
responses together, as the situated improvisations described above can be facilitated
through ‘institutional distancing’ dynamics. These refer to the ability of organiza-
tions to shield their members from ‘the monitoring and reinforcing activities of
ﬁeld-level audiences, weakening commitment to the prescriptions that they endorse’
(Smets et al., 2012, p. 896). To do this organizations reorientate themselves away
from those actors within ﬁelds, such as national regulators, who reproduce logics
that cause complexity. Quirke (2013), in her analysis of Toronto private schools,
offers a subtly different perspective. She highlights the importance of the ‘topogra-
phy’ of ﬁelds, by which she refers to the differing degrees of pressure for confor-
mity which separate core from periphery positions (on this point, see also
Greenwood et al., 2011). In this context, Quirke’s (2013) study shows how, in the
absence of strong regulatory structures, non-conforming schools are sheltered by
their peripheral ﬁeld positions. In particular, peripheral sub-ﬁelds, which share the
same regulatory environment with the wider ﬁeld but are deﬁned by their own dis-
tinctive logics (Quirke, 2013, p. 1676), offer organizations the possibility to focus
on different audiences, draw on alternative logics, and side-step pressures for con-
formity that are deemed problematic.
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This emerging focus on ﬁeld level responses raises some important yet unconsidered
questions. How might organizations exploit the structure of a ﬁeld as part of their
efforts to manage complexity? Do organizations seek to relocate to sub-ﬁelds where
they face less complexity? How are such moves accomplished? In particular, whilst
Quirke’s (2013) reference to the topography of ﬁelds reminds us of the important dis-
tinction between core and periphery, following Lounsbury (2007), and Marquis et al.
(2007), it is important to ask whether the geography of sub-ﬁelds, that is, their loca-
tion in speciﬁc places, also matters with regard to how organizations experience and
respond to complexity. Existing studies have shown how institutional pressures vary
not only in intensity between core and periphery positions, but also between different
geographical locations. Lounsbury (2007) shows this by documenting the different log-
ics between the Boston and New York mutual funds industries, whilst Marquis et al.
(2007) highlight the way speciﬁc logics and pressures affect organizations operating in
different geographical communities. This raises questions of whether responses to
complexity can exploit qualitative differences in the institutional pressures associated
with different geographical locations within ﬁelds, and how this might be achieved?
METHODOLOGY
We conducted a longitudinal case study (Yin, 2009) of the operations of English law
ﬁrms in Italy. Our analysis focused on the period between 1993, when in concomi-
tance with the fully-ﬂedged arrival of English law ﬁrms in Italy the media began to
report on their activities in this jurisdiction, and 2010, which is the year when the
responses to complexity discussed below had been fully deployed. We decided to focus
on Italy because of the high levels of institutional distance between the English and
Italian legal ﬁelds (as noted by Micelotta and Washington, 2013; Muzio and
Faulconbridge, 2013; Testoni, 2013). This distance exposed English law ﬁrms to high
degrees of institutional complexity as they sought to implement strategies that were
informed by their home country institutional logics. Accordingly, this was likely to
constitute a particularly revelatory case (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) for the anal-
ysis of how MNEs experience and respond to complexity.
Stage 1: Data Collection and Analysis
We adopted a two-stage research process. An initial stage consisting of 24 interviews
was completed in 2009 and focused on how institutional complexity affected the oper-
ations of English law ﬁrms in Italy. Respondents included all seniority levels of legal
professionals working for the leading English law ﬁrms in Italy. All interviewees were
Italian nationals as in this stage we were interested in how the practices of English
ﬁrms were perceived in Italy, and how this, in turn, could explain experiences of com-
plexity. To capture the full breadth of actors involved in the Italian legal ﬁeld, we
also included several other stakeholders. We interviewed ofﬁcials in professional asso-
ciations including Il Consiglio Nazionale Forense (CNF) (the national association
which regulates and represents Italian lawyers) and L’Associazione Studi Legali
Associati (ASLA) (as described below, a new lobbying body that represents large law
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ﬁrms). We also interviewed deans of law schools, management consultants, and news-
paper editors. Again, all interviewees were Italian nationals. Table I provides more
details of our interviewees. Interviews lasted between 30 and 120 minutes and were
recorded, transcribed, and translated into English when the original interview was
conducted in Italian. As conﬁdentiality was agreed, the exact identities of interviewees
are not revealed here, but a description of their position/role is provided.
The two authors separately coded transcripts using two high level categories: ‘expe-
riences’ and ‘causes’ of institutional complexity. The ‘experiences’ code captured data
on the difﬁculties ﬁrms had faced in Italy, whilst the ‘causes’ code captured descrip-
tions of the sources of these difﬁculties. We then sub-coded ‘causes’ according to
Scott’s (2008) ‘pillars of institutions’ approach. This approach was chosen because of
its effectiveness in explaining institutional differences between home and host coun-
tries (as demonstrated by Kostova and Roth, 2002; Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013).
In our case, it enabled us to account for the complexity that our interviewees
described through reference to differences between the regulative (formal rules), nor-
mative (social expectation and values), and/or cultural cognitive (conceptual frames
and meanings) components of the Italian (host country) and English (home country)
institutional contexts. In addition, we also sub-coded the ‘causes’ category against the
key actors that caused complexity for our case study ﬁrms so as to reveal the regula-
tive, normative, and cultural-cognitive pressures exerted by each actor. Consistent
with previous analyses of professional ﬁelds (e.g., Burrage et al., 1990; Faulconbridge
and Muzio, 2012), these actors included regulators, practitioners, clients, and univer-
sities and other training providers. The two authors compared all of their code tables
to discuss and resolve any discrepancies.
Table I. Chronology of key events for English law ﬁrms in Italy
Year Event
1993–1999 Entry Major English law ﬁrms establish ofﬁces in Italy through alliances
with local ﬁrms – Clifford Chance with Grimaldi & Associati
(1993), Simmons & Simmons with Grippo and Associati (1993),
Freshﬁelds with Lega Colucci Albertazzi & Arossa (1996), Allen &
Overy with Brosio, Casati and Associati (1997), and Linklaters with
Gianni Origoni (1999).
1997–2001 Consolidation Firms complete full mergers with alliance partners (Simmons &
Simmons and Grippo and Associati in 1997; Clifford Chance and
Grimaldi & Associati in 2000) whilst Linklaters enters ofﬁcial
merger negotiations with Gianni Origoni in 2001.
2002–2004 Crisis Named partner Eugenio Grippo leaves Simmons & Simmonds in
2001; Grimaldi and Associati demerges from Clifford Chance in
2002; Gianni Origoni ends merger negotiations with Linklaters in
2004; Founding partners Giovanni Lega and Paolo Colucci leave
Freshﬁelds in 2004; Founding partner Roberto Casati leaves Allen
& Overy in 2004 (followed shortly afterwards by a number of key
partners in Milan and Turin).
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An initial empirical narrative was then produced to reveal the characteristics and
causes of the complexity that confronted English ﬁrms in Italy. However, this analysis
also revealed change in the nature of this complexity over time. In particular, it
emerged that English law ﬁrms were able to maintain an effective presence in the
Italian market. Thus, a second stage of the project focused on how ﬁrms responded
to the complexity they experienced.
Stage 2: Data Collection and Analysis
We began our second stage with an archival analysis of various media sources (see
Table II). An archive search between 1993 and 2010 against the word ‘Italy’ was per-
formed on The Lawyer; this being the longest established media source covering the
activities of international law ﬁrms. This search yielded 994 returns in the form of
articles, news releases, and editorials. This search was then augmented with a similar
search conducted on the Legal Week database which became available from 1999. This
yielded an additional 1172 items. Furthermore, we consulted 12 expert reports on the
Italian legal profession and 25 documents from professional associations that explicitly
discussed the activities of English ﬁrms in Italy. The two authors independently
reviewed the collected materials by reading these items in their entirety and coding
them using the same structure deployed in Stage 1. In this second stage of the process
we also inductively added two additional codes: ‘key events’ and ‘key ﬁrms’. The for-
mer refers to important episodes in the period of observation when complexity, its
experience, and causes became most visible. Such events included: mergers/de-merg-
ers, ofﬁce closures, partner exits, and encounters with regulators. The latter code
refers to the ﬁrms which were most prominent in these articles. These were: Clifford
Chance, Linklaters, Allen & Overy, Freshﬁelds, and Simmons & Simmons. We then
extracted from our database a total of 155 items which focused explicitly on the oper-
ations of these ﬁrms in Italy. We also mined Stage 1 interviews for any data relating
to these ﬁrms, and gathered additional information from the ﬁrms’ websites. This
allowed us to develop biographies for these ﬁrms relating to their entry strategies,
ofﬁce geography, key specialisms, clients, and transactions in the Italian market. We
then used all of these data to develop a second empirical narrative, which focused on
the history of the selected ﬁrms in Italy.
The second narrative revealed for the ﬁrms in question similarities in the experien-
ces and causes of complexity, and conﬁrmed that towards the end of the period of
observation all of these ﬁrms found a way to manage the complexity they experi-
enced. Following established methodological approaches (as adopted by, amongst
others, Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006b; Greenwood et al., 2002), we then extended
our analysis with a second phase of primary data collection in 2011. To facilitate this,
we revisited our Stage 1 interviews and archival database to identify key informants
in relation to our case study ﬁrms. We then targeted these as part of a second stage
of 23 semi-structured interviews. Speciﬁc roles represented in this sample include the
managing partners of the Italian ofﬁces of the ﬁrms mentioned above. We also inter-
viewed a number of senior professionals from the ﬁrms’ global executive committees
in London. These individuals were purposely selected insofar as they could speak
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directly to the ﬁrms’ internationalization strategy, the issues faced in the Italian mar-
ket, and the response strategies deployed in the period 1993–2010. Table I provides
more information about these interviewees. In this second stage, respondents were
both English (9 interviewees) and Italian nationals (14 interviews).
Interview data were analysed following the same procedures and coding structures
outlined for Stage 1. We also developed inductively from the data a new code entitled
‘responses’, this being used to identify the tactics used by ﬁrms to manage the particu-
lar forms of complexity they encountered. Independently coded data were then again
fully reviewed by the two authors. As part of this process we developed a number of
sub-codes within the broader ‘responses’ category. These related to recurrent
responses that were evident in the data. These sub-codes are: ‘re-scoping’, which was
used to capture data on how ﬁrms changed the scope of the services they offered and
of the clients they served; ‘re-scaling’, which was used to capture data relating to
Table II. Categories of key informants interviewed
Category of informant Numbers interviewed
Role of informants in
constructing analysis
Stage 1 Practitioners and
professional support
staff in law ﬁrms
10 lawyers (all in Italy)
and 3 senior support
professionals
Identiﬁcation of what
complexity meant in
the case study context
and what caused it
Regulators and
professional
associations
4 – including ofﬁcials in
the Italian national pro-
fessional association
(CNF) and in the
Association of Large
Law Firms (ASLA)
Identiﬁcation of the role
of this group of actors
in creating complexity
for English ﬁrms
Law schools 3 – deans of leading law
schools in both Milan
and Rome
Identiﬁcation of the role
of this group of actors
in creating complexity
for English ﬁrms
Consultants
and media editors
4 – editors of specialist
Italian legal press and
consultants to the legal
profession
Development of high
level narrative of how
complexity had played
out over time, and how
the media itself contrib-
uted to ﬁrms’ experien-
ces of complexity
Stage 2 Practitioners
and professional
support staff in law
ﬁrms
20 lawyers and 3 senior
support professionals
(1 managing partner,
1 practice manager and
1 business development
manager)
Provides insights into how
our ﬁve chosen ﬁrms
experienced complexity
and responded to it,
and how these experi-
ences and responses
changed over the
period of observation
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changes in the size and ofﬁce numbers of ﬁrms; and ‘re-stafﬁng’, which was used to
capture data about changes in the characteristics of the lawyers working within these
ﬁrms. As we moved iteratively between theory, data, and analysis (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998), data in the ‘responses’ codes were also coded using the ‘three pillars’
and ‘key actors’ codes developed in Stage 1. This enabled more detailed explanations
of how speciﬁc responses sought to manage the causes and effects of complexity.
Stage 1 interview data and archival data were also retrospectively coded against the
new ‘responses’ code and sub-codes. This allowed us to reﬁne the two empirical nar-
ratives already developed and to produce a third narrative, which focused on how
our case study ﬁrms responded to the institutional complexity they experienced. At
the end of Stage 2, our ﬁndings and interpretations were presented to six interviewees
to allow checks for accuracy. These interviewees were a combination of English and
Italian lawyers, Italian consultants to the legal profession, and media editors. Figure 1
summarizes our coding structure.
Outline of Case
As English law ﬁrms entered the Italian market in the mid-1990s, their internation-
alization strategy, unlike the old foreign outpost model where local ofﬁces acted as
referral points for their headquarters (as documented by Beaverstock et al., 1999),
was to develop a permanent presence and full service capability. This strategy
involved developing domestic law capabilities, employing locally (Italian) qualiﬁed
Figure 1. Coding structure
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lawyers, and servicing Italian as well as international clients. In most cases, an asso-
ciation with a local boutique ﬁrm acted as the means for entering the Italian mar-
ket (see Table III). This approach ensured Italian law expertise plus access to the
social and political capital necessary for procuring high proﬁle local work.
Associations were initially loose affairs whereby the Italian ofﬁces retained a high
degrees of autonomy in matters such as remuneration and pricing structures, work-
ing methods, and even branding. However, English ﬁrms expected that such
arrangements would be the precursor to full integration. Thus, Tony Angel, man-
aging partner at one of the English ﬁrms in question, Linklaters, was reported in
the media as saying, ‘These things [alliances] have to lead to a merger or they
don’t work’ (Grifﬁths, 2004). Indeed, by the early 2000s, as indicated in Table III,
the ﬁrms Clifford Chance, Allen & Overy, Freshﬁelds, and Simmons & Simmons
had sealed mergers with their Italian counterparts, whilst Linklaters was working
towards a similar objective with its long-term Italian partner, Gianni Origoni
Associati. These mergers consolidated the presence of our case study ﬁrms in the
Italian market, increasing their size and local law capabilities, providing additional
ofﬁces (Turin for Allen & Overy; Padua for Clifford Chance and Simmons &
Simmons) and helping them to secure all important Italian corporate clients. By
2001, 80 per cent of Clifford Chance’s 145 lawyers in Italy were locally qualiﬁed
(Cahill, 2003a; The Lawyer, 1999), and 85–90 per cent of clients at Simmons &
Simmons were Italian (Cahill, 2003b). By 2004, with 204 lawyers, Allen & Overy
had become the biggest law ﬁrm in Italy.
Post-merger, ﬁrms embarked on increasing attempts to integrate their Italian ofﬁces
more closely into their global network through the process of standardization, usually
Table III. Archival sources
Source type Sources consulted Signiﬁcance of source
The media 155 items selected from The
Lawyer (1994–2010) and Legal
Week (1999–2010)
Provides a history of English law
ﬁrms in Italy, the issues they
encountered and the strategies they
developed
Expert guides Country reports on Italy by the
Chambers Legal Directory
(9 from 2002 to 2010) and
Legal Business (3)
Provides time-series analysis of key
trends regarding the activities of
ﬁrms as well as contextual informa-
tion on key trends in the Italian
market
Professional association
archives
Annual reports from Consiglio
Nazionale Forense – national
professional association
(12 – from 2002 to 2013);
press releases from the
Associazione Studi Legali
Associati – representative
body for large law ﬁrms (13)
Offers insight into reactions to
English law ﬁrms from key mem-
bers of the Italian legal ﬁeld
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centred on London-derived practices and structures. Thus in the words of one of our
respondents:
You just couldn’t have unaligned bits of the ﬁrm tagged on.. . . We were really
focused on trying to move the ﬁrm as a single integrated unit. (English Global
Managing Partner, Global Law Firm)
However, as evidenced in Table III, within a two-year period, all of the mergers
or merger negotiations in question had collapsed as key partners on the Italian
side resigned. Vittorio Grimaldi quit Clifford Chance in 2002, taking with him
30 lawyers and most of the Rome ofﬁce (Cahill, 2002a). The next couple of
years also saw founding partners Casati, and Lega and Colucci leave Allen &
Overy and Freshﬁelds, respectively (Collins, 2004; Grifﬁths, 2005; Sutton, 2006).
Meanwhile, in the same period the scheduled merger between Linklaters and
Gianni Origoni Associati was called off (Grifﬁths, 2004). In the next section, we
explain how these difﬁculties can be understood through the lens of institutional
complexity.
Causes of Institutional Complexity
As English ﬁrms entered the Italian market in the mid-1990s, they faced a very dif-
ferent institutional context from their home country. Whilst a full comparative analy-
sis of the Italian and English legal professions is beyond the scope of this paper (but
see Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013), Table IV uses a ‘pillars of institutions’
approach (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Scott, 2008) to tease out the differences between
these two national contexts and their regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive
foundations. Following Abel (1988) we divide the regulative pillar in two further
components: the regulation of the production of producers (i.e., rules governing professional
qualiﬁcation), and the regulation of the production by producers (i.e., rules governing profes-
sional practice).
These different institutional contexts produced two national variants of the pro-
fessional logic: an Italian professional logic which was closest to traditional under-
standings of collegial professionalism (on which, see, for example, Lazega, 2001),
and an English professional logic which was closest to the managerial professional-
ism described elsewhere (e.g., Brock et al., 1999). Although these are national var-
iants of the same logic (professionalism), for ease of expression we refer to them
throughout as the English professional logic and the Italian professional logic.
Table V outlines the key characteristics of each of these two logics. The differences
between these are signiﬁcant because logics prescribe ‘how to interpret organiza-
tional reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to succeed’ in a
particular ﬁeld (Thornton, 2004, p. 70; cited in Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 318).
Consequently, as English law ﬁrms internationalized into the Italian market and
sought, as part of their post-merger integration strategies, to reproduce practices
inspired by the English professional logic, they experienced signiﬁcant levels of
complexity.
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Table IV. Institutions of the Italian and English legal professions – a ‘three pillars’ approach
Institutional pillar Italy England and Wales
Exemplary quotes illustrating English ﬁrms’ experiences of difference between the English and Italian
contexts
Regulative Law degree as
mandatory entry
qualiﬁcation
Multiple qualiﬁcation
routes. Increasing
role of ﬁrms in
training provision
One of the major differences we have experienced over the years is that most English
lawyers, the trainees have very little knowledge of the law. This applies to all ﬁrms
because your system is different, it does not necessarily need to take 3 or 4 years of
law to become a lawyer contrary to what you do here. . .One company are thinking
about providing a 6 month version [of the compulsory law degree] so, it is potentially
after not having done a law degree, you be a lawyer after 18 months. . .English law-
yers they ﬁnd themselves lawyers but sometimes, their concepts are a bit
nebulous. . .Honestly I believe our system [in Italy] has many failings, many shortfalls,
but I feel more conﬁdent uh, in dealing with one of my youngsters that you know a
trainee or youngster from the UK. (Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
Legal education as
theoretical
Legal education more
specialized and
applied
I think the difﬁculty will be for Italian Universities to somehow, give these people a
more practical approach. . .they still look at the formal concept of creating a lawyer
which suits the Italian market. . .So far the problems is that we have an enormous
amount of lawyers, too many lawyers coming in to the uh, market, those suitable for
our needs are very small percentage of these lawyers coming out of School. (English
Partner, Global Law Firm)
State exam as key
entry barrier
Training contract as
key entry barrier
We had to allow them all [Italian trainees] very long periods of time off for their Bar
exams and quite a few of them wouldn’t pass the Bar exams ﬁrst time around and
would need to go back and do more. And we had to be constantly mindful of the
requirements. I think there was also a requirement for them to go every week and
spend a certain amount of time studying at the Bar school as well. (Italian Partner,
Global Law Firm)
Highly regulated
with restrictions
on advertising,
naming, fee set-
ting and employ-
ment practices
Progressive de
regulation and
liberalization
Yes, ﬁrstly there were some Italian regulatory restrictions, for example the name, we
had to keep [the name of the Italian Firm] in the name because of Italian Bar rules.
That set it apart from other parts of the global ﬁrm because although it was a fully
integrated part of the ﬁrm it didn’t look like it because of that name. It took many
years before we could really major to the [Global Firm Name]. And even that has
involved a degree of bending of the rules. (English Partner, Global Law Firm)
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Table IV. Continued
Institutional pillar Italy England and Wales
Exemplary quotes illustrating English ﬁrms’ experiences of difference between the English and Italian
contexts
The most serious problem is the fact that whilst all over Europe we have salaried law-
yers, in Italy this is not possible because the professional association prohibits lawyers
from being in any form of salaried employment. The rights of ‘ius postulandi’ (ability
to provide legal representation) is reserved to self employed lawyers, and salaried pro-
fessionals have no rights of audience in court, cannot participate in judicial processes
and cannot use the title of ‘avvocato’. This has created a range of difﬁculties. . ..
(Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
Normative Individual/small
scale practice
Organizational/large
scale practice
I don’t have any ambitions to build an eternal law ﬁrm. I couldn’t care less whether my
ﬁrm continues into the next new century. (Italian Managing Partner, Global law Firm
– quoted in quoted in Pawsey, 2003, p. 71)
Clifford Chance (CC) is facing the threatened departure of senior banking partner Luigi
Chessa following a row over the management of the City giant’s Italian
practice. . .Legal Week understands that the threatened departure is related to a dispute
over the running of CC’s Italian arm, with the magic circle ﬁrm aiming to move the
practice to more formal management lines typical in Anglo-Saxon ﬁrms. (Legal Week,
2002)
‘The cult of the personality deﬁnitely exists in Italian law ﬁrms’, says one Italian lawyer.
‘These men reach a very high status within the legal profession and make incredible
amounts of money, but they do not leave any lasting legacy’. (Mooney, 2002)
Client relationships
long term and
personalized
Client relationships
transactional and
institutionalized
As in Italy we have mainly family businesses, what is more important is the personal
relationship with the family, not the brand of the law ﬁrm. When I was a partner
80% of clients were my personal clients. (Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
It’s easy for the independent ﬁrms to survive, because clients pick ﬁrms for individuals,
not just brands. (Pawsey, 2003, p. 76)
Throughout the world [major manufacturing MNC] is historically one of the main
clients of this ﬁrm but it wasn’t a client in Italy. This is because [major manufacturing
MNC] had traditionally preferred another ﬁrm. I couldn’t explain to London why we
couldn’t make a bid for [major manufacturing MNC]. It was forbidden for me
1
0
1
‘F
ield
R
elo
ca
tio
n
’
a
s
a
R
esp
o
n
se
S
tra
teg
y
V C
2
0
1
5
T
h
e
A
u
th
o
rs
Jo
u
rn
a
l
o
f
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
S
tu
d
ies
p
u
b
lish
ed
b
y
Jo
h
n
W
iley
&
S
o
n
s
L
td
a
n
d
S
o
ciety
fo
r
th
e
A
d
va
n
cem
en
t
o
f
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
S
tu
d
ies
Table IV. Continued
Institutional pillar Italy England and Wales
Exemplary quotes illustrating English ﬁrms’ experiences of difference between the English and Italian
contexts
because I couldn’t go beyond the back of a competitor with whom we had a good
relationship. We couldn’t poach the client because we were colleagues with this other
ﬁrm. (Italian Business Development Manager, Global Law Firm)
Inequality in com-
pensation and
governance
structures
Relatively compressed
compensation
structures
Alliances have failed in the past because the income of top Italian lawyers is much
higher than the top rates in the lockstep. The lockstep in the Magic Circle goes up to
£1m – perhaps a little more. But the personal income of the top lawyers in Italy
ranges between e10m and e20m. If you want to get into this market, you need suc-
cessful lawyers, and if you want successful lawyers, you can’t cap them with a lockstep.
(Italian Partner, Global Law Firm – quoted in Sutton, 2006, p. 74)
The biggest challenge is remuneration. Traditionally, in an Italian ﬁrm the equity is
held by the name partners and anyone else they may deem worthy. The difference in
salary between a junior and a senior partner is often as high as 500%, sometimes
much more. Remuneration, and in particular the vast salaries earned by the
superstars, has made merging with UK ﬁrms run on a lockstep problematic. (Pawsey,
2003, p. 72)
Cultural-Cognitive Individualized
practice
Culture of teamwork
and organized
practice
My experience is that lawyers of other jurisdictions are more efﬁcient in terms of pro-
ductivity. There is a cultural thing here whereby lawyers are not a service provider.
But a kind of gurus of mastering the laws, so they can take the time they like. (Italian
Associate, Global Law Firm)
In Italy in the Italian ﬁrms, we have the myth of the great sole practitioner, the great
lawyer, the One. Everyone I would say dreams of being the Man, the real lawyer, the
Great Lawyer. . .there are the great egos in the ﬁrm and they don’t act as a team -
everyone looks at his own interests. (Italian Associate, Global Law Firm)
Gianni says: ‘A top lawyer wants to be a lawyer, not an administrator. If you want to import
the London management style into Italy you will have to adapt it to the Italian mentality
to succeed’. Milan partner Roberto Casati points out: ‘UK ﬁrms are too hierarchical and
at times lawyers feel they are employees rather than partners. Italian lawyers are
free-spirited prima donnas who are entrepreneurial. They do not like being told what to
do - especially attending numerous meetings and compiling reports’. (Ruckin, 2007a)
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Table IV. Continued
Institutional pillar Italy England and Wales
Exemplary quotes illustrating English ﬁrms’ experiences of difference between the English and Italian
contexts
Italian lawyers don’t toe the party line, and don’t the English know it. It’s not because
they want to rebel-far from it: there’s a strong hierarchy in which lawyers ascend with
age. No, rather it’s because they work alone. Two is a crowd and a party simply isn’t
tolerated. That’s why international ﬁrms have so much trouble. (Pawsey, 2003, p. 71)
Brosio Casati had 78 lawyers when merging in 1998 with A&O. Before that, we had no
managing partner, no titles and a lack of structure. It was run by consensus, a small
partnership culture. A&O was run more as a business. (Carman, 2006)
Civil law focus on
mastery of legal
codes
Common law focus
on development of
bespoke solutions
If you are in a securities department, or in banking and ﬁnance or in M&A department
[in an English ﬁrm], it is just paper, paper, paper, and agreements that you take from
precedents. How many times a day do you pick up the civil code and check and you
learn and you study, I don’t pick it up many times! That’s not normal for an Italian
lawyer. (Italian Associate, Global Law Firm)
Generalist
orientation
Specialist orientation Specialization is in my opinion a form of intellectual poverty. . .A lawyer should have a
maturity of judgment that can only be acquired if he has had an exposure to a broad
range of legal practice. (Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
Source: Adapted from Muzio and Faulconbridge (2013).
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Complexity and Tensions
In this section we structure our analysis of complexity and the tensions it generated
by focusing on the role of the key actors in the Italian legal ﬁeld. In particular, we
show how the practices of English law ﬁrms were viewed as illegitimate in Italy as a
Table V. The contrasting English and Italian professional logics
English professional logic Italian professional logic
Dominant mode of
organization
The large law ﬁrm with executive
committees, practice groups and
dedicated functional depart-
ments (HRM, IT)
The small partnership in which all
professionals engage in client
work, dedicated managers and
specialist functions are absent
Limited liability partnership The collegial partnership
Source of legitimacy The commercial value-added of
advice to the client
The technical sophistication of
advice to clients
The size of the ﬁrm and the
reputation of its brand
The expertise, reputation and per-
sonal connections of individual
professionals
Mode of control Control over both means of pro-
duction (working methods) and
ends (quality of work) through
management systems and per-
formance appraisals Executive
authority invested in distinct
managerial roles (senior and
managing partner)
Professional autonomy and individ-
ual discretion with regards to
means of production. Control
over end of production (quality of
work) through peer review and
market reputation. Executive
authority invested in a few inﬂuen-
tial individuals (named partners
and key rain makers)
Global deontological codes all pro-
fessionals must follow
Individual discretion (within pro-
fessional codes) to manage ethi-
cal issues
Means of production High levels of routinization and
formalization
Low levels of routinization and
formalization
Increasingly formalized and hier-
archical divisions of labour.
Specialized departments and
teams
Broad roles and functions, with
low levels of specialization
Professional orientation A focus on the ﬁrm’s strategic pri-
orities and interests
A focus on individual interests of a
small group of dominant
partners
Loyalty to the ﬁrm
Institutionalized client
relationships
Loyalty to the profession
Individualized long-term client
relationships
Structures of remuneration The success of the ﬁrm prioritised
over individuals, leading to the
use of seniority based proﬁt-
share models of remuneration
(the lock-step model)
The success of individuals priori-
tised in remuneration, with high
degrees of inequality as remu-
neration reﬂects proﬁts earned
by the individual partner (the
eat what you kill model)
Source: Fieldwork, and adapted ideas from Cooper et al. (1996), Lazzega (2002), and Mintzberg (1979).
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result of differences between the English and Italian professional logics. Following
established approaches to the study of professional ﬁelds (e.g., Burrage et al., 1990;
Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012), the actors focused upon are: practitioners, clients,
regulators, and universities and other training providers. Such an approach is useful
as logics are carried and reproduced by actors within ﬁelds (Greve et al., 2010;
McPherson and Saunders, 2013), and therefore, in the case of MNEs, tensions
emerge when the prescriptions of home country logics and the practices they inspire
come into contact with the different logics and practices held by local actors in an
institutionally distant host country context.
Practitioners. Our Italian lawyers characterized the practices of English ﬁrms using
words like ‘imperialist’, ‘colonialist’, and in one case even ‘racist’; all of which referred
to the tendency of these ﬁrms to assume the superiority of their home country prac-
tices and to seek to reproduce these in the Italian context. In particular, substantial
points of friction emerged as the managerial approach typical of English ﬁrms clashed
with the more individualist orientation of Italian lawyers. As both Italian and English
interviewees observed:
There was a lot of Micro Management. I will give you an extreme example but
there are many more. It was Christmas and I received an email from the
European Managing Partner: ‘Alessandro [changed name], as you know,
Christmas is approaching. You should of course organize a party. You should pro-
vide beverages but no alcohol. It should be in the afternoon but not too late –
around 5 pm. You should thank the staff, starting from the support staff and then
our associates but you shouldn’t mention the partners.’ In other words they were
spelling out everything for me. (Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
They [Italian Partners] felt that it [the managerial approach of English ﬁrms] was
impinging almost on their freedom, their liberty, and their expression as a profes-
sional and that they were being put into some sort of sausage machine. And that
was one of the many reasons why these things were never going to work because
you’re dealing with a generation that didn’t want to be compared to an Excel
spread sheet. (English Partner, Global Law Firm)
‘Management’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘hierarchy’, and ‘being an employee’ were all signalled
by our interviewees as the most recurrent sources of tension, these being typical of
the English professional logic (see Table V). Differences in the approach to legal work
adopted by our case study ﬁrms also generated some signiﬁcant legitimacy issues. In
particular, deeply held understandings of lawyers as ‘consigliores’ or trusted advisors
conﬂicted with the hyper-specialization and standardization typically pursued by
English ﬁrms. As one interviewee put it:
English law ﬁrms, . . . are characterised by high levels of specialization and a
Tayloristic approach to work, which I do not agree with . . . specialization, in
my opinion, can lead to a form of intellectual poverty and stunts professional
development from being a technician to a real advisor. (Italian Partner, Global
Law Firm)
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Moreover, the individualistic focus of the Italian professional logic (Table V) led to
clashes over material issues such as governance and remuneration. Highly dispersed
compensation structures meant Italian top partners earned substantially more than
their English counterparts (Table IV; see also Moshinsky, 2007b; The Lawyer, 1999,
2001). Consequently, ﬁtting their expectations into the global lock-step pay structures
typical of English law ﬁrms proved problematic:[1]
The bottom line was is that the average net proﬁt attributable to each partner in Italy
was probably about two and a half times that of a partner in the rest of the ﬁrm. . . . So
what happened is that the terms of the merger were only ever going to work if an
Italian partner was receiving two and a half times what a partner of his generation, or
her generation would be receiving elsewhere in the ﬁrm. And that of course created a
huge kick back tension within [Global Firm]. And so it got to a point, a bit like mar-
riages, where it just was never going to work. (English Partner, Global Law Firm)
As an example, when Clifford Chance merged with Grimaldi e Associati, local senior
partner Vittorio Grimaldi was earning approximately three times more than the high-
est paid partners in London (Cahill and Jordan, 2003; Grifﬁths, 2000a). The solution
was to award in Italy additional equity points on the global lock-step scale which
allowed the ﬁrm to pay higher levels of remuneration. However, this led to the para-
doxical situation of having partners in a peripheral ofﬁce earning signiﬁcantly more
than their counterparts at headquarters, and undermined the notion of a global part-
nership from the very start. Indeed, the move was so controversial that it almost
derailed the merger: Clifford Chance had to postpone the all partner vote on the
deal in order to win support from its London partners for a bespoke Italian pay struc-
ture (Grifﬁths, 2000b).
Overall the clashes between the Italian and English professional logics translated
into a steady stream of defections. In the post integration period English law ﬁrms
lost partners, practice groups, and even whole ofﬁces (on such departures see
Table I and also Cahill, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003b, 2003c; Legal Week, 2004;
Mooney, 2002; Moshinsky, 2006, 2007a; O’Connor, 2005; Pawsey, 2003; Sutton,
2006). Importantly, whilst in early cases these defections were largely instigated by
Italian professionals themselves as they became disenchanted with the English pro-
fessional logic and the practices it inspired, over time such moves became more
consensual or were even actively engineered by our case study ﬁrms. Indeed, as
discussed more in the next section, such moves were part of attempts by English
ﬁrms to reconﬁgure their Italian operations so as to reduce complexity. As one of
our interviewee noted:
[Global ﬁrm] hated the fact that he [superstar Italian lawyer] was so dominant within
the organisation. They hated it because no other partner could do that in the rest of
ﬁrm. And they made his life impossible. (English Partner, Global Law Firm)
Clients. Whilst Italian clients were impressed with certain features of English ﬁrms,
such as their ‘organization’, ‘proactive service’, and ‘24 hour capabilities’, they ulti-
mately displayed a strong attachment to local norms stressing long-term relations and
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a highly personalized service (Table V). English law ﬁrms thus faced a series of difﬁ-
culties when dealing with Italian clients, as evidenced by the vignette reported below:
It is often recounted that when Clifford Chance launched its new Padua ofﬁce
amid great fanfare, as the local partners were explaining the structure and philoso-
phy of the ﬁrm, they were asked by a local business man ‘Where are Mr Clifford
and Mr Chance? I am Mr. Brambilla, I am the owner of my ﬁrm which is called
Brambilla, and I only want to talk to the owner of the ﬁrm not with an employee.’
From this point the audience became concerned with the whereabouts and indeed
with the health of Mr Clifford and Mr Chance. Where were they? Were they alive?
This gives you an idea of the conditions that met these ﬁrms, which were at a loss
in front of such questioning. (Italian Editor, Trade Publication)
This vignette indicates the primacy of personal connections in the Italian context, as
clients tended to place their trust in individual professionals rather than in organiza-
tional brands. Furthermore, the global deontological codes developed by English law
ﬁrms to minimize conﬂicts of interest precluded their lawyers from engaging in some
key practices necessary to cultivate close client relationships in Italy. Thus, for exam-
ple, English law ﬁrms tended to prevent their lawyers from joining the boards of their
clients as non-executive directors. However, this type of arrangement was not only
commonplace in Italy but it was also considered as an exemplar of good client rela-
tionships. As such, the practices of English ﬁrms not only deprived Italian lawyers of
a very effective business development tool, but were also likely to appear illegitimate
to local clients, as the following quote illustrates:
One of the rules at [Global Firm] was that lawyers were not allowed to sit on the
executive boards of their clients. This is a grave offense for an Italian client. If an
Italian client asks you to join their board and you decline. . .they wouldn’t under-
stand. . . (Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
Other tensions stemmed from the business model adopted by English ﬁrms, which led
them to focus on large one-off transactions rather than on providing day to day assis-
tance. This clashed with the realities of the Italian market and the expectations of
local clients who do not ‘require scores of associates working on large transaction but
partner led day to day service, whereby the client calls on a regular basis and requires
speciﬁc advice from a senior person’ (Italian Partner, Global Firm). Another respond-
ent, an English partner, summarizes this attitude very succinctly: ‘In Italy the clients
said you’re my lawyer you just do all my work.’ The result, as indicated below, was
that without engaging in routine daily work it was difﬁcult for English ﬁrms to secure
the large corporate transactions they sought:
[Global ﬁrm] was a transactional ﬁrm and didn’t engage in day to day advice.
Before merging with [Global ﬁrm] we had some very important family businesses,
like [Italian family business x] which had a 6 billion euro turnover. You can’t tell
such a client I won’t help you with your agency contracts but then expect to be
called when the ﬁrm requires advice on a 450 million euro investment in China.
(Italian Partner, Global Law Firm)
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Regulators and policy makers. Regulators and policy makers such as the CNF and the
Organismo Unitario Avvocatura Italiana (OUA – a lobbying body for the legal pro-
fession) endorsed in their policies and public pronouncements a vision of independent
generalist practice which was far removed from the organizational model of English
law ﬁrms. Thus, in the words of Guido Alpa, president of the CNF, ‘professional
ﬁrms are not enterprises’ (cited in Micelotta and Washington, 2013, p. 1156), whilst
his counterpart at the OUA, Maurizio DeTilla, echoed this point by stating how
‘Italian lawyers cannot become employees in law ﬁrms’ (Cavestri, 2010). As indicated
in Table IV, these normative understandings of legal practice were embodied in a sys-
tem of professional regulation which explicitly prohibited or rendered difﬁcult a series
of practices which were commonly adopted by English law ﬁrms. These included sala-
ried employment, marketing/advertising, competitive billing, and limited liability. As
such, when our case-study ﬁrms sought to reproduce some of these practices in the
Italian context, they were viewed as highly illegitimate. Accordingly, English law ﬁrms
were met with hostility by Italian regulators, who explicitly talked in terms of defend-
ing the Italian professional logic: ‘Individual professionalism is being marginalized by
organizational forms of professionalism with all their well-known problems. . .. We
need to oppose these tendencies. . .’ (Alpa, 2010).
This stance manifested itself in a series of initiatives which sought to challenge,
sanction and de-legitimize English law ﬁrms. Thus, for example, both Freshﬁelds and
Allen & Overy were publicly accused in the Italian parliament of undercutting fees by
almost 30 per cent; something which was against Italy’s minimum fees rules (Mizzi,
1999). Meanwhile, the Milan and Rome bar investigated a range of ﬁrms for disclos-
ing information about client transactions. This was standard marketing practice in
London but was forbidden by Italy’s professional code of conduct (Collins, 2005). Of
course, whilst these are the most high level and publicly visible manifestations of regu-
latory conﬂicts, Italian regulations also restricted and complicated the operations of
English law ﬁrms on a daily basis. Thus, one of our respondents commented upon
how the requirements of the Italian qualiﬁcation regime generated some signiﬁcant
complexities by limiting the ability of ﬁrms to reproduce standard training and staff-
ing practices:
We had to allow them all [Italian trainees] very long periods of time off for their
Bar exams and quite a few of them wouldn’t pass the Bar exams ﬁrst time around
and would need to go back and do more . . . What tended to happen was you’d
have more people working on an average job in Italy than anywhere else in the
world. So an average job that in London you might have a team of four people
working on it, in Italy you might have a team of eight people working on it
because, you know, some of them would be off here or there to do this or . . . you
would often have lots of different people appearing for short periods on the same
transaction, all needing to get up to speed with it. (English Partner, Global Law
Firm)
Universities and other training providers. Of the four ﬁeld actors here described, univer-
sities and other training providers had the least direct contact with English ﬁrms.
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Yet, by shaping the skillsets and mind-sets of Italian lawyers, they did act as an
important source of tension. In particular, there was a disconnection between the
skills that universities and the Italian qualiﬁcation system more generally furnished
graduates with, and the requirements of English ﬁrms. This is partly because in
Italy university law degrees tended to be highly traditional, technical, and theoreti-
cal, placing emphasis on historical and philosophical subjects like the institutions
of Roman law, jurisprudence, or canon law, rather than on more applied topics
or on the development of transferable skills. Furthermore, at the time Italy, unlike
England, did not have a post-degree vocational education system where competen-
cies relating to the practice of corporate law could be developed (Faulconbridge
et al., 2012).
In effect, the approach to legal education in Italy supported many of the elements
of the Italian professional logic detailed in Table V. This inevitably created tensions
when English ﬁrms sought new recruits capable of and willing to implement their
home country inspired practices. Thus in the words of one of our respondents:
Italian universities were not at all producing people who were well equipped to
become lawyers in an international law ﬁrm. The education was heavily focused,
was very academic, very focused on private law, very Italian. (English Partner,
Global Law Firm)
Particular examples of the tensions that ensued include the dismay indicated by a pre-
vious respondent at not regularly ‘picking up the civil code’ in his daily practice
(Table IV), as well as the sense of surprise felt by the associate below with regard to
the academic qualiﬁcations of some of his superiors:
Sometimes we ﬁnd them difﬁcult even strange [global ﬁrms’ home country prac-
tices]. For example. . .when we know and we see that sometimes in other jurisdic-
tions you can have a university degree in matters different from law and then you
take a short course and you can be a lawyer. We have some partners here who
graduated at Math or Physics or something like that. (Italian Associate, Global Law
Firm).
Responding to Complexity: Re-scoping, Re-scaling, and Re-stafﬁng
The discussion above is indicative of the institutional complexity that our case study
ﬁrms experienced in the post-integration period. As a result of signiﬁcant differences
between England and Italy in terms of their country institutional proﬁles (Table IV)
and of the prescriptions associated with their respective professional logics (Table V),
many of the practices that our case study ﬁrms sought to implement were viewed as
illegitimate. Ultimately, as documented in the previous section, this led to the unravel-
ling of the mergers detailed in Table III as local lawyers defected, ﬁrms themselves
sought to squeeze out practitioners who resisted their global strategies, and clients
expressed doubts with regard to certain aspects of the ﬁrms’ practices. Meanwhile, as
discussed, regulators questioned the legality of some of the organizational structures
and practices of our case study ﬁrms. As result, over this period, the tensions and
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difﬁculties affecting the Italian operations of English ﬁrms became increasingly evi-
dent, both within Italy and at global management level in London:
I met our global managing partner in the lift and he said to me ‘you are in Italy
aren’t you? Italy accounts for 3 per cent of our workforce and 6 per cent of our
proﬁts. That’s pretty good. Pity those 25 per cent of my troubles’. (English Partner,
Global Law Firm).
Well it forced us to look at Italy and say what are we going to do in Italy? Do we
want to stay in Italy? If we’re going to stay in Italy how are we going to do it?
And on more than one occasion an English partner was sent to Italy to ‘rebuild
the Italian practice’. It was a sort of continuing exercise if you see what I mean. I
certainly got used as senior partner to be ready every now and again to have to ﬂy
to Italy to sort something out. (English Global Partner, Global Law Firm)
This raises an important conundrum: how did our case study ﬁrms respond to the
institutional complexity they experienced? The responses we observed involved three
interrelated organizational tactics: re-scoping, re-scaling, and re-stafﬁng.
Re-scoping. Re-scoping involved ﬁrms reconsidering what kind of work they did and
for which clients. The following quote captures this change in focus:
Their primary concern becomes to support the likes of Barclays, and J. P. Morgan
in Italy. . . If an Italian partner brings a local medium sized client, with a turnover
of let’s say 500 million euros, that is, of course [good], but this is not a primary
concern. Today with their new lighter structures of around 70 lawyers or so these
ﬁrms can survive very well by simply servicing the work provided by the global net-
work. (Italian Editor, Trade Publication)
Thus, as part of these re-scoping exercises ﬁrms began to ‘get rid of local clients, all
the SMEs, just to focus on the city banks’ (English Partner, Global Law Firm).
Importantly for our argument, these local clients were the ones who were most likely
to enact those normative prescriptions towards long term personal relations, day to
day partner led advice, and so on which have been described above (see Table V)
and which clashed with the practices of English ﬁrms. Moreover, these kinds of cli-
ents were also more likely to seek advice from those ‘big personalities’, ‘big men’
(Mooney, 2002), or ‘trusted men’ (Sutton, 2006) who were at the heart of the highly
personal and politicized networks of corporate relations which characterized the
Italian economy. These men (and they were always men), as the demergers and
defections described above suggest, were also the least likely to accept and conform
to London-centric policies and practices. Thus, re-scoping reﬂects a complex interac-
tion between market (pursuing particular legal activities ﬁrms are competent in) and
institutional motivations (avoiding types of activities that whilst proﬁtable exposed
ﬁrms to high levels of complexity).
As ﬁrms focused on a select number of ‘30–40 core global clients’ (English Partner,
Global Law Firm), this triggered a rebalancing of their portfolio of activities towards,
in particular, banking and capital markets law. Capturing this shift in client proﬁle,
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one of our respondents recognized how ‘Italian clients have shrunk over the last 5
years or so from 70 to 40% of our turnover. 70% of our clients are large banks and
ﬁnancial institutions’ (English Global Managing Partner, Global Law Firm). This also
emerges clearly from the quotes below which comment on the strategy of two differ-
ent ﬁrms in our sample:
Talking about [English ﬁrm x] you can you see it; they’ve shrunk their corporate
practice quite considerably, from four partners to one. (English Partner, Global
Law Firm)
I get the feeling [English ﬁrm y] may choose focus on the areas where they are
really a signiﬁcant player, like banking and ﬁnance, capital markets and dispute
resolution. (Lind, 2009b)
Conversely, over the same period domestic specialisms such as employment, prop-
erty, and corporate (including M&A) law, which are traditional areas of practice
for a full-service law ﬁrm, declined in importance. Thus, for instance, Allen &
Overy in 2009 lost its entire employment (Lind, 2009b) and environmental (Lind,
2009c) law practices as well as conducting a signiﬁcant redundancy programme
within its corporate department (Lind, 2009b). Additional indications of re-
scoping are suggested by a historical comparison of the Chambers Annual
Country Guides for Italy. These, on the basis of extensive client interviews, rank
(in ﬁve bands) the reputation of ﬁrms within a range of different specialisms
(Chambers, 2002, 2010). As such, they provide an indication of the signiﬁcance of
a law ﬁrm’s activity within a number of different practice areas. The Chambers
Guides for Italy reveal that, already in 2002, English ﬁrms enjoyed a leading posi-
tion in banking and ﬁnance related domains, ﬁlling three of the top ﬁve slots in
those particular rankings. This situation has persisted with English ﬁrms occupying
similar positions in 2010. However, whilst in 2002 some English law ﬁrms, like
Clifford Chance, occupied leading positions in corporate and M&A law, by 2010
no English ﬁrm was higher than in the fourth band. Whilst Chambers is only a
proxy measure and does not capture the actual reduction in the size of these
areas of practice, falls in reputation rankings corroborate our previous narrative,
suggesting that over time our case study ﬁrms re-scoped and shifted their prior-
ities away from domestic specialisms.
Re-scaling. Re-scaling involved at its most fundamental level a reduction in ofﬁce size
and numbers. As a result of the re-scoping exercise described above, the emphasis of
our case study ﬁrms shifted from pursuing Italian domestic work to servicing the
Italian leg of global ﬁnancial transactions. This shift meant ﬁrms required fewer law-
yers. Thus, Freshﬁelds shrank from its apex of 120 lawyers in 2002 to 88 in 2011,
Clifford Chance from 145 to 100, whilst over the same period Allen & Overy
reduced its size by almost two thirds to a headcount of 64. One of our respondents
provides direct conﬁrmation of this re-scaling exercise:
If you look at the partner numbers between 2006 and say 2008 they lost something
like 50% of the equity partners in Italy and they’ve reduced the ﬁrm down from
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three to two ofﬁces and probably the number is about 50% of when I left. (English
Partner, Global Law Firm)
Importantly, as hinted at in the quote above, such re-scaling processes had a geographi-
cal dimension. Firms shrank their Italian ofﬁce footprint as they retreated towards Milan.
Thus, Allen & Overy divested its Turin’s ofﬁce in 2006 (Moshinsky, 2006), whilst both
Simmons & Simmons and Clifford Chance closed their Padua operations in 2007 and
2010, respectively (Ruckin, 2007b; Swift, 2010). These ofﬁces were located in Italy’s
industrial heartlands and made particular sense as part of a strategy of developing a
nationwide presence that could service domestic transactions. In particular, if ﬁrms were
to build their Italian corporate law practices they had to be close to their target clients,
many of which were privately held SMEs with a regional base. However, as ﬁrms re-
scoped their operations, these ofﬁces became increasingly redundant. Similarly, over the
same period our case study ﬁrms downsized their Rome ofﬁces which had traditionally
been equivalent in size and importance to Milan. Thus, as an example, between 2007
and 2009, Clifford Chance reduced its Rome ofﬁce by 35 per cent against a more limited
8 per cent reduction in Milan (Lind, 2009a). As one interviewee noted: ‘We’ve
repositioned. . .we no long have a Rome capital markets group, we no longer have a
Rome corporate group’ (English Partner, Global Law Firm). As we discuss below, this
geographical rebalancing made particular sense as it corresponded with the rise of Milan
as Italy’s ﬁnancial capital and key global city.
Re-stafﬁng. Finally, the re-scoping and re-scaling exercises outlined above were tied to
a rethinking of the proﬁle of lawyers sought by English ﬁrms. The ensuing re-stafﬁng
processes reﬂected the new strategic focus on banking and ﬁnance law, but were also
a response to the difﬁculties encountered when dealing with traditional Italian law-
yers. Speciﬁcally, the star practitioners or ‘big personalities’ that were targeted in the
original mergers for their expertise and client networks, never considered themselves
as employees of the ﬁrm and acted independently. As described above, these practi-
tioners reproduced an Italian professional logic and were a source of signiﬁcant insti-
tutional complexity for our case study ﬁrms. Consequently, as such individuals left, or
in some cases were actively pushed out, they were replaced with a new generation of
internationally minded recruits who were more sympathetic to the English professio-
nal logic and its related practices. For instance, ﬁrms became much more systematic
in targeting lawyers who had some prior exposure to Anglo-Saxon work cultures and
approaches to lawyering. Of particular importance here, besides evidence of overseas
work or study experience, were the more commercially and internationally oriented
degree programmes which were being developed by private elite universities. The
assumption was that these individuals were more likely to understand and appreciate
the practices of English ﬁrms and were, therefore, less likely to reproduce institutional
complexity. Thus, our case study ﬁrms used their re-scoping exercises as an opportu-
nity to re-staff themselves with a new type of internationally and organizationally
focused practitioner. The following quotes speak clearly to this theme:
Today, if we look at the talent we are trying to attract, we’re trying to attract people
that deﬁnitely want to be in an international law ﬁrm. That deﬁnitely understand
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things that we’re talking about, and there’s not many of them, but we’re looking for
those people. That was unheard of a few years ago. And it is that kind of lawyer to be
honest that we need to breed now. (English Partner, Global Law Firm)
It was a younger demography, it was people who had experience of having worked
in Anglo Saxon ﬁrms, often relatively recently, either because we recruited them
from Anglo Saxon ﬁrms or they’d maybe, you know a lot of Italian lawyers will
have worked in the US for a year or two and then come back to Italy and found it
frustrating. Not all of them but some of them found the change frustrating, they
liked the kind of work they’d been doing in New York, didn’t like so much the
kind of work they were doing in Italy. And the kind of position they had in those
ﬁrms was not always, you still had the great man whoever it was at the top. (Italian
Partner, Global Law Firm)
‘Field Relocation’ and the Role of ‘Receptive’ Sub-Fields
The three organizational tactics described above formed an effective response to com-
plexity since, taken together, they facilitated a ‘ﬁeld relocation’ strategy. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrms used these tactics to enable them to relocate, that is, move geographically, and
focus the majority of their activities on a new and more ‘receptive’ sub-ﬁeld which
had emerged in the city of Milan during the early 2000s. Following Quirke (2013),
we refer to this as a sub-ﬁeld because, whilst it shared the same regulatory environ-
ment as the broader Italian legal ﬁeld, it was populated by a distinctive set of actors
who ultimately produced less complexity for our case study ﬁrms. In particular, as we
describe below, this sub-ﬁeld was more ‘receptive’ as the actors populating it were
more open to alternative institutional logics, prescriptions, and practices. By open to
alternatives we mean more willing to accommodate the prescriptions of alternative
logics. In our case this refers to the English professional logic which, as described
above, was perceived to be illegitimate in the traditional Italian legal ﬁrms but was
less so in this new Milan sub-ﬁeld. Below, we examine how this sub-ﬁeld emerged
and how it was more ‘receptive’.
The emergence of the Milanese sub-ﬁeld was, in the ﬁrst instance, the result of the
cumulative effects of a series of domestic and European reforms which commenced in
the late 1990s, but began to have notable effects in the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s.
Speciﬁcally, an exogenous jolt (Meyer, 1982) provided by the process of
Europeanization and the creation of the single market inspired in Italy a series of neo-
liberal reforms, including the privatization of state owned enterprises and the reform of
banking regulations (Pammolli et al., 2007). Privatizations are particularly relevant to
our story not only because the process itself required professional expertise, but also
because they created a number of new large corporate entities with increasingly sophis-
ticated and international legal requirements. Particularly noteworthy here were the
mergers between Unicredit and German bank HVB in 2005 (with the addition of
Capitalia in 2007), and between SanPaolo and Banca Intesa in 2007 which created
two of the largest banks in Europe (Illman, 2006; Ruckin, 2007a). These banks were
large, headquartered in Milan, international in their orientation, and focused on
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shareholder value. Furthermore, they regularly engaged in the sorts of ﬁnancialized
operations, such as securitizations, project ﬁnancing, and private ﬁnance initiatives, in
which English ﬁrms had signiﬁcant experience. As such, privatization created a new
market which English law ﬁrms were ideally placed to serve (The Lawyer, 2000). A fur-
ther key development was the privatization in 1998 of the Milan stock exchange (La
Borsa Italiana) which then merged in 2007 with the London Stock Exchange, further
integrating Milan within global capital markets. Thus, towards the end of our period
of study, Milan had ﬁnally ‘shaken off its industrial past and gained a reputation as the
country’s economic and ﬁnancial centre’ (The Lawyer, 2000). This centrality in the
world of ﬁnance rendered Milan a particularly ‘receptive’ sub-ﬁeld location where
English ﬁrms could experience reduced complexity.
In particular, the Milanese sub-ﬁeld was increasingly populated by a new category
of transnationally oriented client with rather different legal requirements and expecta-
tions to those of the privately and/or family owned SMEs typical of industrial centres
such as Padua and Turin, or of the public sector clients which dominated the Rome
market. These clients naturally looked to English law ﬁrms for their expertise in ﬁnan-
cial transactions and, importantly for our argument, adopted a different approach to
professional relationships, as they procured legal services on a transactional basis
through competitive tendering processes (beauty parades); something which is well
aligned with the practices of our case study ﬁrms. Hence, client expectations of per-
sonalized, informal, and long term approaches to professional relationships, which as
discussed above had challenged the legitimacy of English law ﬁrms in Italy, were
somewhat diminished in the Milan sub-ﬁeld. As one commentator noted:
Italy’s nascent PFI market offers lucrative work possibilities for UK law ﬁrms, being
one of the few practice areas in which instructions ﬂow from competitive tender
processes, rather than personal contacts. It is also a practice area in which UK
ﬁrms have superior experience to their Italian rivals. (O’Connor, 2004)
Thus, Milan was a more ‘receptive’ location as clients here were more open to the
practices of English ﬁrms. As a result, English ﬁrms also became a powerful force
shaping the evolution of legal practice in the Milan sub-ﬁeld.
However, it was not just the openness of clients to the practices of English ﬁrms
that rendered Milan more ‘receptive’. Practitioners in this sub-ﬁeld had also become
increasingly distinct from their colleagues in the wider Italian legal ﬁeld. In particular,
practitioners in Milan recognized how English law ﬁrms brought with them a new
organizational template based on scale, specialization, and standardization that was
better aligned with the needs and expectations typical of transnational clients. Indeed,
it was the perceived threat posed by English ﬁrms that persuaded in the late 1990s
three traditional superstar lawyers, Professor Franco Bonelli in Genova, Sergio Erede
in Milan, and Professor Aurelio Pappalardo in Bruxelles, to combine their own highly
proﬁtable boutique ﬁrms to create, in Milan, Bonelli, Erede and Pappalardo (BEP),
which is now Italy’s largest law ﬁrm. Whilst this is the most iconic example of change,
many major Italian ﬁrms, like Gianni Origoni Associati or Studio Legale Chiomenti,
also developed with reference to the Anglo-Saxon model of practice. In the words of
one of our respondents, a number of Italian ﬁrms pursued collaborations with global
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ﬁrms and only ‘broke up their alliances after they had learned what they needed, in
terms of competences, business models, and commercial practices, from their English
partners’ (Italian Consultant to the Legal Profession). One result of this was a process
of consolidation. Whilst in the mid-1990s very few ﬁrms in Italy had more than 10–
15 lawyers, by 2011 over 45 ﬁrms exceeded a headcount of 50 (Top Legal, 2012).
Thus, in Milan at least, the large ﬁrm had become an increasingly legitimate structure
for professional practice. In this context, as part of their ‘ﬁeld relocation’ strategy,
English ﬁrms were able to exploit, through the re-stafﬁng tactics described above, the
growing pool of practitioners who were increasingly attuned and sympathetic to the
realities of large scale legal practice.
Moreover, the Milan sub-ﬁeld was also populated by a new type of university.
Speciﬁcally, new elite law schools began to develop their curricula with reference to
the needs of large corporate law ﬁrms. Most notable in this regard is Bocconi
University School of Law which was established in 2006. This school, like Cattolica
which is also based in Milan, developed a business oriented law degree that
brought with it a rethinking of traditional Italian legal education. Changes included
a shift in curricula from historical and philosophical subjects towards corporate spe-
cialisms, the introduction of English language courses, a focus on the development
of transferable skills, and the introduction of extra-curricular activities to boost
employability (Bocconi, 2014). During the same period, academic training in the
UK or USA became increasingly institutionalized as a requirement for aspiring elite
lawyers (Faulconbridge et al., 2012). In this context, global law ﬁrms quickly devel-
oped relationships with these new universities in order to exploit but also help
develop changes which were conducive to their work. As one of our interviewees
noted:
Some Universities are making efforts to close this gap and to give these guys some
more practical experience. For instance, here in Milan, the Law School of Bocconi
University prepares students just for this kind of work, so at the end of their 4 years
in school they take some credits, spending time in ﬁrms like ours. (Italian Partner,
Global Law Firm)
The emergence of these new commercially focused universities is important because it
further ensured that the Milanese sub-ﬁeld was populated with a new type of bicul-
tural or ‘cosmopolitan’ (Smets et al., 2012, p. 888) professional who was familiar with
and open to the logics and practices of English law ﬁrms. Hence, in line with the ﬁnd-
ings of others (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Smets et al., 2012), our case study ﬁrms
sought to minimize complexity by targeting in their recruitment policies speciﬁc uni-
versities that were more aligned with their particular approach to legal work. As one
interviewee put it:
Bocconi has a more commercial orientation which is perhaps more suited for a
ﬁrm like ours. . .Bocconi speaks the same language as international law ﬁrms. This
is a difference, which I notice, between Bocconi and candidates from other univer-
sities, who may also be excellent from a purely technical point of view. . .students
who graduate at Bocconi are already more oriented towards the work of
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international law ﬁrms. Cattolica in Milan is also increasingly making similar
moves. (Italian Human Resources Ofﬁcer, Global Firm)
We also see indications of a recursive process at work. English ﬁrms, through their re-
stafﬁng tactics, exploited the new labour market conditions available in the Milan
sub-ﬁeld, but through their own presence and growing importance as prospective
recruiters, were also able to inﬂuence the development of academic programmes and
curricula in ways that were beneﬁcial to them.
Meanwhile, although national regulatory institutions remained disconnected from if
not hostile to large scale practice, in 2004 English law ﬁrms joined forces with large
Italian practices to create in Milan their own association – Associazione Studi Legali
Associati (ASLA). ASLA, which was founded and is still led by former Freshﬁelds part-
ner Giovanni Lega, has over the years participated in a number of debates on the
reform of the legal services market and engaged in processes of institutional entrepre-
neurship to help its members manage some of the regulatory tensions that continue to
be generated by the Italian institutional context (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013). The
development of best practices in terms of how to deal with ‘employed’ lawyers (Asla,
2014), which as discussed are not legally recognized in the Italian system (Table IV),
and the introduction of simulations to reduce the number of court hearings as part of
the qualiﬁcation requirements of trainees, are examples of this role. As such, ASLA has
actively tried to change existing rules in favour of its membership so as to reduce the
regulatory pressures faced by large ﬁrms operating in the Italian institutional context.
The combined effects of ASLA, the growing numbers of practitioners attuned with
the realities of large scale legal practice, the development of business oriented univer-
sities, and the increasing presence of transnational corporate clients, was to produce
in Milan in the 2000s a more ‘receptive’ sub-ﬁeld in which English ﬁrms could sur-
vive and even ﬂourish. Table VI summarizes how this ‘receptivity’ resulted from
important developments in relation to the four key actors that populated the
Milanese sub-ﬁeld. Thus, by relocating to Milan, English ﬁrms were able to exploit
the opportunities offered by this new sub-ﬁeld, increasing their legitimacy and mini-
mizing the complexity they experienced.
DISCUSSION
Our objective in this paper was to examine how law ﬁrms, as a distinctive type of
MNE, experience and respond to institutional complexity as they internationalize. We
revealed how these MNEs are confronted by a distinctive form of spatial complexity
which relates to differences between home and host country variants of the same
logic, in this case professionalism. In this context, we show how these organizations
were able to respond to complexity at the ﬁeld level through a ‘ﬁeld relocation’ strat-
egy as they refocused their operations around a more ‘receptive’ sub-ﬁeld which had
emerged in the city of Milan and which their activities in turn helped to shape and
consolidate. As such, we make a series of contributions.
First, we develop the new concept of ‘ﬁeld relocation’ as a strategic response to
institutional complexity. This is a ﬁeld level strategy, which in our case is supported
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Table VI. Key actors in the Milan sub-ﬁeld
Actors
Nature and logic in
Italian legal ﬁeld
Nature and logic in
Milan sub-ﬁeld
Differences in logics that
lead to reduced complexity Illustrative quotes
Practitioners Small scale (often
family based)
practices Low
levels of speciali-
zation/
formalization
Emergence of large
Italian Professional
Services Firm
Higher degrees of
specialization and
formalization
Large law ﬁrm with
its more managed
characteristics
accepted as legiti-
mate and useful
form
If you want to ﬁght the battle with Clifford Chance and
Freshﬁelds then you have to increase your critical mass.
(Callister, 1999)
Bruno Gattai, Simmons & Simmons’ head of corporate in Milan,
knows the system will have to change. ‘Anglo-Saxon ﬁrms have
helped to change the structures of Italian ﬁrms’, he says. ‘Italy
is now a very competitive market, Italian ﬁrms must change if
they want to secure the best lawyers and this is happening step
by step, little by little’ (itali e tu grimaldi – Legal Week 2002)
Clients Privately held com-
panies State con-
trolled
organizations
MNEs (global banks
especially) and
publically listed
companies
Transactional rela-
tionships accepted,
and law ﬁrm
critical mass and
specialization
recognized as an
asset
If you look at our Milan client proﬁle this is undistinguishable
from the rest of our global network. (Partner, Top
International Firm)
An Italian ﬁrm can no longer do all the work for an Italian cli-
ent’, Immordino says. ‘Fifteen years ago a local practice could
have done 85% of an Italian company’s work.’. . .He adds:
‘Now clients are becoming more sophisticated and relationships
are becoming more institutional. It’s a long process, but that’s
where it’s trending.’ (Lloyd, 2008: Italy: Jostling for position
(Legal Week, 2008)
Professional
associations
Focused on individ-
ual professionals
Creation of ASLA as
the representative
Provides a counter
balance to national
ASLA brings together all law ﬁrms, who sharing an associated
approach to practice, wish to debate common issues and
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Table VI. Continued
Actors
Nature and logic in
Italian legal ﬁeld
Nature and logic in
Milan sub-ﬁeld
Differences in logics that
lead to reduced complexity Illustrative quotes
and hostile to
large scale
practices
association for large
law ﬁrms
associations and
their focus on small
practices. Promotes
the legitimacy and
merits of large scale
practice
develop new innovative organizational solutions. ASLA lobbies
for the development of new organizational models and for the
modernization of law ﬁrms. (http://www.aslaitalia.it/asla/)
Universities Traditional law
degrees in public
universities
Theoretical,
domestic and
generalist orien-
tation in degree
programmes
Elite privately owned
universities increas-
ingly applied, inter-
national and
specialist orienta-
tion in degree
programmes
Commercial
awareness and
specialization
promoted alongside
theoretical expertise
We began to develop closer partnerships with the career ofﬁces of
certain Universities. Here in Milan Bocconi is the most organ-
ized from this point of view. It has a very efﬁcient placement
ofﬁce and it incorporates mandatory work experience periods
as part of its undergraduate degrees, something which in Italy
no one else does.
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and enabled by three internal organizational tactics: re-scoping, re-scaling, and re-
stafﬁng. These tactics allow an organization to reconﬁgure itself so as to target a new
and more favourable ﬁeld location. ‘Field relocation’ is rendered possible by the
uneven and dynamic nature of ﬁelds (e.g., Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Greenwood
et al., 2011; Quirke, 2013) which presents organizations with locations which are
more or less ‘receptive’ to their logics and practices. Thus, ‘ﬁeld relocation’ is distinct
from other responses noted in the literature such as buffering (e.g., Oliver, 1991),
decoupling (e.g., Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008), compartmentalization (e.g., Binder,
2007; Hamilton and Gioia, 2009), hybridization (e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010;
Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Pache and Santos, 2013), and situated improvisation
(e.g., Smets et al., 2012) in which complexity is mainly addressed within the organiza-
tion itself. In particular, compared to these well documented responses, ‘ﬁeld reloca-
tion’ addresses complexity externally by changing the organization’s geographical
location in the broader ﬁeld it inhabits. As such ‘ﬁeld relocation’ develops the limited
literature on ﬁeld level responses to complexity in a number of ways. For instance, it
shows how the ‘institutional distancing’ described by Smets et al. (2012) can have dis-
tinctive geographical dimensions, as organizations move to more ‘receptive’ locations
where actors are more supportive of their logics and where, accordingly, their activ-
ities are likely to enjoy higher levels of legitimacy. It also develops Quirke’s (2013)
analysis by showing how organizations can actively seek to exploit the patchy and
uneven topography of ﬁelds through their own location strategies.
Second, we develop the concept of ‘receptivity’. Whilst this has been previously
deployed to refer to the likelihood of organizations conforming to pressures emanat-
ing from different ﬁeld members (Delmas and Toffel, 2008), here we use it to indicate
the openness of a particular ﬁeld location to alternative institutional logics, prescrip-
tions, and practices. In our case, the ‘receptivity’ of the Milan sub-ﬁeld was connected
to a series of broader developments in the Italian political economy which led from
the late 1990s to the rise of Milan as an international ﬁnancial centre and to its inte-
gration into the global economy. This increased the likelihood that the Milan sub-
ﬁeld would become more ‘receptive’ to the practices of the global organizations it
increasingly hosted. Whilst more work to further deﬁne the concept of ﬁeld ‘receptiv-
ity’ is needed, our contribution points to two key characteristics. First, ‘receptivity’ is
a dynamic and evolving condition, as it is connected to broader ﬁeld level develop-
ments (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Importantly, this relates to the suggestion that
‘over the longer term, institutional complexity unfolds, unravels and re-forms, creating
different circumstances to which organizations must respond’ (Greenwood et al.,
2011, p. 319) and highlights the need to examine how ﬁeld level responses to com-
plexity exploit opportunities that are temporally bound (Faulconbridge and Muzio,
2014). In our case this relates to the way that ‘ﬁeld relocation’ only became possible
as a strategy in the mid-2000s when, as a result of the exogenous jolts (Meyer, 1982)
of Europeanization and re-regulation, the Milan sub-ﬁeld became increasingly estab-
lished. Second, ‘receptivity’ is also relative to other locations within a ﬁeld which may
generate greater degrees of complexity and lesser prospects for success. This is exem-
pliﬁed in our case study by the Milanese sub-ﬁeld being more ‘receptive’ than other
locations such as Padua or Rome. This highlights the importance of examining the
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way ‘receptive’ sub-ﬁelds are associated with particular locations within a ﬁeld and
how ﬁrms might strategically exploit such locations.
Third, we advance the emerging body of work that focuses on the geography of
institutional ﬁelds (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis et al.,
2007). This literature has long recognized the importance of the difference between
peripheral and core positions. Thus, for instance, we can expect actors in peripheral
positions to draw less beneﬁts from membership of a particular ﬁeld (Fligstein and
McAdam, 2012), to be more aware of alternatives and committed to change
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006a, 2006b), and to be better placed to side-step pres-
sures for conformity which are less avoidable in core positions (Quirke, 2013). This
differentiation between core and periphery positions and their respective structural
characteristics is what Quirke (2013) refers to as the ‘topography’ of ﬁelds. Our case
study goes further and suggests the geography of ﬁelds and sub-ﬁelds, in terms of their
association with particular geographical locations, also matters. Thus, for instance, it
mattered that the speciﬁc sub-ﬁeld that our case study ﬁrms targeted was located in
the city of Milan, as a speciﬁc geographical place with its own distinctive history, cul-
ture, and institutions. In particular, it mattered that Milan as a rising global city and
ﬁnancial centre was increasingly integrated in the global economy and, as such, was
populated by a range of actors who were different from the rest of the Italian legal
ﬁeld. Thus, following Lounsbury’s (2007) seminal contribution, our analysis by exam-
ining the geographical variability of ‘receptivity’ within ﬁelds highlights the impor-
tance of locating ﬁelds and their sub-ﬁelds. This is important because, as the
‘receptivity’ of the Milan sub-ﬁeld indicates, institutional prescriptions are exercised in
patchy and uneven ways within different ﬁeld locations. As such, organizations must
take account of the characteristics and opportunities offered by different locations
within ﬁelds as part of their attempts to manage and reduce complexity.
Fourth, we begin to recognize how ‘ﬁeld relocation’ as a response to complexity may
be characterized by a degree of recursivity (on which, see Smets et al., 2012). As
Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 357) note, little is known about ‘how organizational responses
have feedback effects’. The ‘ﬁeld relocation’ strategy analysed here provides an indica-
tion of at least two forms of feedback effects. First, we have recursive effects between the
various organizational tactics through which ‘ﬁeld relocation’ is accomplished. Our case
study revealed the importance of three such tactics: re-scoping, re-scaling, and re-
stafﬁng. These tactics are potentially characterized by an element of concatenation
(Smets et al., 2012; Tilly, 2001) in that all three were required for English ﬁrms to effec-
tively deploy their ‘ﬁeld relocation’ strategy. To give one example, in our case at least, re-
scoping necessitated re-scaling. When our case study ﬁrms decided to re-scope to priori-
tize certain types of legal work and clients, re-scaling also became necessary as these ﬁrms
shed lawyers who were unsuited to their new market focus. Similarly, re-scoping and re-
scaling encouraged re-stafﬁng as a new proﬁle of lawyer with different skills and compe-
tences was now required. As such our case suggests a number of feedback effects and
interdependencies between the different organizational tactics associated with ‘ﬁeld relo-
cation’. Second, recursivity also appears along another dimension. ‘Field relocation’ was
facilitated by ﬁeld level changes which were already in train but which, in turn, our case
study ﬁrms helped to shape and consolidate. Thus, in our case study, a set of
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developments in the Italian political economy, such as the exogenous jolts (Meyer, 1982)
of Europeanization and re-regulation, facilitated the emergence of Milan as a more
‘receptive’ sub-ﬁeld. Our case study ﬁrms exploited the opportunities created by this
structural change through their ‘ﬁeld relocation’ strategies. However, ‘ﬁeld relocation’
not only reduced the complexity our ﬁrms experienced but also appeared to contribute
to the development of this new sub-ﬁeld. Thus, for instance, our ﬁrms brought with them
a set of new labour market demands which entrepreneurial universities like Bocconi and
Cattolica could target with their more commercially focused courses and programmes.
Meanwhile, English ﬁrms also provided a reference point for ambitious practitioners and
local ﬁrms like BEP as they remodelled themselves to respond to new threats and oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, our case study ﬁrms cooperated with some of their Italian counter-
parts to create a new dedicated association – ASLA – to represent their interests and
lobby for institutional change. As such our case study indicates that a recursive relation
between organizational responses and ﬁeld level dynamics is important.
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NOTE
[1] Lock-step is a partner remuneration model, particularly prevalent in English law ﬁrms, whereby a part-
ner’s share of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is tied to his or her seniority (deﬁned as number of years as a partner).
Every year a partner is awarded additional points on the equity scale (and accordingly an entitlement to
a bigger share of the proﬁts), until they reach the ‘top of equity’ ceiling. This contrasts with the ‘eat what
you kill’ model, favoured by Italian law ﬁrms, where partner remuneration is tied much more closely to
individual billings.
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